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ARGUMENT
L

THE PURPOSE OF THE GOVERNMENTAL iMMU N1 r V \ ( '< I ^
BROAD AND INCLUDES MANY COMPONENTS.

I he State claims that the purpose of the Immunity Act ("the Act") is "twofold:
(i) to provide the State \\ iih an opportunity to eonect the condition that caused the
injury, and (ii) to evaluate and possibly settle the claim without litigation
Hi I"" i

State's

1 lie purpose cited by the State is too narrow. It is too narrow and it

ignores the many other purposes behind the Immunity A.

Ydmittedly, the

purposes the State has cited are relevant, however tho\ :n

i

i

:^ ; n:

the more broad and appropriate purpose recognized by the Utah Supreme Court.
In Wills v Hshrr Vnllrv Hist RR Auth., 2m„h\ 1111 4:\ '"> P.3d 934, the
Supreme Court stated the "primary piupoiv of the intuv n| elaiin u\|uirenienl is
to afford the responsible public authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and
tiinolv investigation of the merits of the claim and to arrive at a timely settlement,
if appropriate, thereby avoiding tlv ^ - . \np

-

•

. -u^

;v,bl, and

unnecessary litigation." Wills at ^[6 (citing Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d
480, IN2 11 lah I M80)) The issue in the Wills case was whether delivering the
notice of claim to the Attorney General at an acithes. where he holds himself out
to be, but does not physically work, strictly complied with the Act, when the Act
was ambigui »os regarding what was required. In Wills, the State claimed that the
purpose of the Act was to "maximize efficiency of chum processing by limiting
the delivery of notices to one location," and such efficiency "can -

1

^

J

v

by interpreting the Act to mandate that a notice of claim be directed and delivered
to the attorney general himself at the location in which he keeps a desk and chair."
Id. at f 5. The Supreme Court in Wills held that this purpose is too narrow and the
view of directing and delivering to be too restrictive. Id.
Like the Wills case, this case is similar because the section of Act is void of
guidance, it has not been interpreted by any Utah Appeals Court, and the State has
claimed the purpose is narrow. In this case, the "twofold'" purpose the State has
cited is too narrow because it ignores the other important purposes which are part
of the Act. For example, in Wills, the Supreme Court recognized that "[ejfficient
claim processing is a component" of the more general pmpose of the statute. Id. at
%6. As in Wills, the purpose cited by the State in this case is certainly a
"component" of the more general purpose. However, this Court should look to the
more general purpose of the statute that includes many important components. By
recognizing a general purpose like the Wills court did, all components like
investigation of the location, ascertainment of the cause, correcting the dangerous
condition, efficient claims processing, evaluation of the claim, settlement of the
claim, etc., will get the attention they deserve.
Holding that the purpose of the Act is more general, i.e. to allow the State to
conduct an investigation, evaluate and possibly settle the claim, Plaintiffs and the
State will benefit. The State will benefit because they will be required to conduct
a thorough investigation which will allow them to address all relevant components
in an accurate and responsible manner. Plaintiffs will benefit because, after the
2

State has conducted a thorough and complete investigation, the State will be in a
better position to settle a meritorious claim. Therefore, by recognizing that the
purpose is general or broad in nature, all responsibilities of the State and Plaintiffs
will be considered and dealt with in a fair and proper manner.

II.

CASES CITED BY THE STATE ARE DISTINGUISHABLE.

The State relies on two cases in their brief to stand for the proposition that
Utah courts have addressed the "content" of the claim. State's Br. P. 11. The two
cases are Years ley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990) and Straley v. Halliday,
997 P.2d 338 (Utah App. 2000). The two cases are distinguishable because both
involve a different section of the statute. The issue in Years ley and Straley was
whether the plaintiffs notice gave a sufficient statement of the "nature of the
claim." Moreover, the cases are also distinguishable because the section in the
Act regarding the "nature of the claim" is better defined than the section in this
case1. In this case, the issue is whether Ms. Peeples gave a sufficient "brief
statement of facts." Under the Immunity act a plaintiff is required to include "(i) a
brief statement of the facts; (ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and (iii) the
damages incurred by the claimant so far a they are known." Utah Code Annotated
§ 63-30-11 (2000 & Supp. 2003).

1

As used in this chapter: (1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for
money or damages against a governmental entity or against an employee." Utah
Code Ann. §63-30-2(1997).
3

In Yearsley, the court looked to whether the plaintiff could maintain an action
for unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution when the notice of claim only
complained of assault and battery. Yearsley at 1127. In Straley, the plaintiffs
claim was dismissed where the notice of claim failed to allege conduct that
amounted to a violation of the law. Straley at 342. Specifically, in Straley the
plaintiff only alleged in their notice that Judge Halliday acted "wrongfully and
willfully" and did not allege that he acted with "malice" or committed a "fraud"
which are required to preserve a claim against a governmental employee. Id. In
both Yearsley and Straley, the issue was whether the plaintiff included a proper
statement regarding the "nature of the claim," which is defined by Utah Code Ann.
§63-30-2. See, footnote 1.
Here, Yearsley is distinguishable and not relevant because the case involved
distinct causes of action. For example, an assault or battery is fundamentally
different than malicious prosecution or unlawful arrest. Each crime or claim
involves different facts that need to be proven at trial and in the case of malicious
prosecution versus assault or battery, the facts are completely different in both
time and injury. Also, the statute defines what a "claim" is for the purposes of a
notice of claim. See, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2 and footnote 1.
Also, Straley is distinguishable because it again falls under the same section of
the Act which requires a plaintiff to give the "nature of the claim." In the Straley
case, the plaintiff simply failed to allege facts that constitute a claim against a

4

governmental employee. As the State put it, the plaintiff failed to "utter[] the
magic words 'fraud or malice.'" State's Br. P. 12.
In this case, Plaintiff did allege the proper legal claim and further claims that
she submitted a proper "brief statement of facts." Unlike the facts of Yearsley or
Straley the issue of what constitutes a proper statement of facts is not clear. The
Act is completely void of any guidance regarding what is a proper "brief statement
of facts." There is no definition in the statute like there was in Yearsley and
Straley. The courts have never defined what constitutes a "brief statement of
facts." Finally, to impose a standard that requires plaintiff to include material
facts or "magic words" would impose a burden on the Plaintiff that is not required
by the Act.

III.

EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE NEEDS TO BE CONSIDERED TO
DETERMINE IF PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE WAS CONGRUENT WITH
THE PURPOSE OF THE ACT.

Extrinsic evidence needs to be considered to determine if Plaintiff s notice of
claim was congruent with the purpose of the Act. In the State's brief, the State has
argued that actual notice is irrelevant. State's Br. P. 15. This argument is
misplaced because it ignores the issue that was raised by Plaintiff. What the State
has ignored is that Plaintiff not asking this Court to substitute actual notice for a
deficiency in the notice of claim. Plaintiff is asking this Court to consider is the
extrinsic evidence to determine if it provided sufficient information to allow the
State to conduct an investigation, which would include remedying the problem,
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ascertaining the amount of Plaintiff s damages, the exact location of the accident,
the cause of the accident, the date and time of the accident, Plaintiffs injuries,
witnesses who may of observed the accident, and other relevant components.
The reason why the extrinsic evidence needs to be considered is because it is
impossible to determine if the notice was congruent with the purpose without
considering what the State did with the information once the notice was received.
For example, if the trial court needed to determine if the State was able to conduct
an adequate investigation, we must address the investigation and decide if the
notice had enough information to allow the State to accomplish their objectives. If
the trial court needed to determine if the notice of claim provided enough
information to allow the State to remedy the problem, we need to consider if,
based on the notice, the problem was fixed. If the trial court needed to determine
where the accident was located, we need to consider if, based on the notice, the
State was able to discover the location of the accident.
In sum, if a court has to determine if the notice was congruent with the purpose
of the Act and the purpose of the Act is to afford the State a proper and timely
investigation, we must consider the adequacy or inadequacies of the investigation.
In this case, the trial court refused to consider any such extrinsic evidence. R. 80,
l

|{6. Therefore, to adequately determine if Plaintiff s notice was congruent with the

purpose of the Act, assuming that this court holds that the notice is not
independently sufficient, this Court should remand this case to the trial court to
determine if the investigation was successful based on the notice.
6

IV.

PLAINTIFF HAS NOT RAISED ANY ISSUE ON APPEAL THAT
WAS NOT RAISED BELOW.

The State alleges that Plaintiff raised a new "issue" on appeal. State's Br. P.
17. The State's argument is incorrect. In Plaintiffs appeal brief, Plaintiff urged
this Court to look to Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (2000) for guidance when
interpreting the Immunity Act. Plaintiff did not cite this statute below and by
citing Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2, the State believes that this is a "new issue" that
should not be addressed because it was not raised below. Although the statute was
not raised below, it is not a new issue because it is merely legal support for
Plaintiffs argument. Specifically, § 68-3-2 falls under Title 68 (Statutes), Chapter
3 (Construction), and this section of the code is relevant to the interpretation of the
statutes of Utah. Here, Plaintiff has only cited § 68-3-2 in support of her argument
that ambiguous statutes, like the statute in this case, should be "liberally construed
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice." Utah Code
Ann. § 68-3-2.
In the alternative, the State has argued, if this Court addresses 68-3-2 on its
merits, the Immunity Act "overcomes any law relating to general statutory
construction," and Plaintiff is using 68-3-2 to overrule the "express mandate and
language of the Immunity Act." State's Br. P. 18. The State is both correct and
incorrect in this assertion. The State is correct to the extent that the Immunity
Act's requirements and standards are not abrogated by 68-3-2. However, the State
is incorrect to the extent the State believes Plaintiff is using 68-3-2 to "overrule the
7

strict compliance principle" found in the Immunity Act. This distinction needs to
be addressed.
The generally cited requirement under the Act is strict compliance, however,
when there is ambiguity in the Act, both the Supreme Court and this Court have
looked to the purpose of the Act to detemiine if the Plaintiffs notice of claim was
congruent with the purpose and objective of the Act. See, Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT
App 247, f25, 53 P.3d 2 and Wills v. Heber Valley Historic Railroad Auth., 2003
UT 45, f6. Because the Act in this case is completely void of guidance regarding
what facts to include, Plaintiff has cited and this Court should find § 68-3-2 to
stand for the proposition that when there is ambiguity in the statute, statutes should
be "liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to
promote justice." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2. By viewing Plaintiffs notice fairly,
in light of the ambiguity in the Act, Plaintiff is only asking this Court to use its
discretion and to follow the laws of this State as interpreted by the courts.

CONCLUSION
In sum, Plaintiff is respectfully asks this Court to hold that Plaintiffs notice
was sufficient to constitute strict compliance under the Act because she included a
"brief statement of the facts" that was congruent with the purpose and objective of
the Act. In the alternative, this Court should reverse the trial court's decision and
remand the case to consider extrinsic evidence and determine if Plaintiff s notice
of claim sufficiently provided the State enough information to pursue a proper and
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timely investigation of the merits of the claim and to arrive at a timely settlement,
if appropriate, thereby avoiding the expenditure of public revenue for costly and
unnecessary litigation.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7

day of April, 2004.

Siegfried & Jensen

Brock A. Van de Kamp
Dustin Lance
Attorneys for the Plaintiff/ Appellant
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